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Should Aid Reward Performance? 
Evidence from a Field Experiment on Health  
and Education in Indonesia †
By Benjamin A. Olken, Junko Onishi, and Susan Wong *
We report an experiment in 3,000 villages that tested whether incen-
tives improve aid efficacy. Villages received block grants for maternal 
and child health and education that incorporated relative performance 
incentives. Subdistricts were randomized into incentives, an otherwise 
identical program without incentives, or control. Incentives initially 
improved preventative health indicators, particularly in underdevel-
oped areas, and spending efficiency increased. While school enrollments 
improved overall, incentives had no differential impact on education, 
and incentive health effects diminished over time. Reductions in neo-
natal mortality in nonincentivized areas did not persist with incentives. 
We find no systematic scoring manipulation nor funding reallocation 
toward richer areas. (JEL F35, I18, I28, J13, J16, O15)
A recent movement throughout the world has sought to improve the links between development aid and performance. For example, the United Nations has sought 
to focus developing country governments on improving human development and 
poverty alleviation by defining and measuring progress against the Millennium 
Development Goals. Even more directly, foreign assistance given out by the 
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US Millennium Challenge Corporation is explicitly conditioned on recipient coun-
tries meeting 17 indicators of good governance, ranging from civil liberties to immu-
nization rates to girls’ primary education rates to inflation, and a new movement has 
advocated that “Cash on Delivery” aid to countries that would explicitly give aid 
based on achieving specific outcome indicators (Birdsall and Savedoff 2009). The 
World Bank is similarly moving toward “Program for Results” loans, which would 
condition actual World Bank disbursements on results obtained. The idea of linking 
aid to performance is not limited to the developing world: the United States has used 
a similar approach to encourage state and local school reform through its Race To 
The Top and No Child Left Behind programs.
Yet despite the policy interest in linking aid to performance, there is little evi-
dence on whether this approach works, and there are reasons it may not. For exam-
ple, those individuals in charge of implementing aid programs may not directly reap 
the benefits of the performance incentives, most of which flow to program benefi-
ciaries in the form of future aid programs, not direct payments to implementers. 
Even if implementers do respond, there can be multitasking problems, where effort 
allocated toward targeted indicators comes at the expense of other, nonincentivized 
indicators (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991). There can also be attempts to manipu-
late indicators to increase payouts (Linden and Shastry 2012). And, if government 
budgets are allocated based on performance, there is a risk that performance-based 
aid will redirect budgets to richer areas that need aid less.
To investigate these issues, we designed a large-scale, randomized field experi-
ment that tests the role of financial performance incentives for villages in improving 
maternal and child health and education. Villages received an annual block grant 
of approximately US$10,000, to be allocated to any activity that supported 1 of 12 
indicators of health and education service delivery (such as prenatal and postnatal 
care, childbirth assisted by trained personnel, immunizations, school enrollment, 
and school attendance). In a randomly chosen subset of subdistricts, villages were 
given performance incentives, in that 20 percent of the subsequent year’s block 
grant would be allocated among villages in a subdistrict based on their relative per-
formance on each of the 12 targeted indicators. To test the impact of the incentives, 
in other randomly chosen subdistricts, villages received an identical block grant 
program with no financial performance incentives. Otherwise, the two versions of 
the program—with and without performance incentives—were identical down to 
the last detail (e.g., amounts of money, target indicators, facilitation manuals, moni-
toring tools, information presented to villagers, cross-village meetings to compare 
performance on targeted indicators, etc). The experimental design thus precisely 
identifies the impact of the performance incentives.
A total of 264 subdistricts, with approximately 12 villages each, were random-
ized into a pure control group or 1 of 2 versions of the program (incentivized or 
nonincentivized). Surveys were conducted at baseline, and then 18 and 30 months 
after the program started. With over 2,100 villages randomized to receive either the 
incentivized or nonincentivized program (plus over 1,000 control villages), and over 
1.8 million target beneficiaries in treatment areas, to the best of our knowledge this 
represents one of the largest randomized social experiments conducted in the world 
to date, and, hence, a unique opportunity to study these issues at scale.
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We begin by examining the impact of the incentives on the 12 main indicators. 
Given the large number of potential outcomes in a program of this type, we pre-
specified our analysis plan before looking at the outcome data, and we examine the 
average standardized effects across the 8 health and 4 education indicators. Using 
data from the household survey, we find that after 30 months, compared to con-
trols the block grant program overall had a statistically significant, positive average 
impact on the 12 health and education indicators, such as weight checks, antenatal 
care, and school participation rates. Comparing the incentivized and nonincentiv-
ized treatments, we find the incentives led to greater initial performance (e.g., at 
18 months) on health, but no differential performance on education. Specifically, the 
average standardized effect across the 8 health indicators was about 0.04 standard 
deviations higher in incentivized rather than nonincentivized areas. While this dif-
ference is modest, the incentives’ impact was more pronounced in areas with low 
baseline levels of service delivery: the incentives improved the health indicators 
by an average of 0.07 standard deviations for a subdistrict at the tenth percentile at 
baseline. The estimates suggest the average increases we observe may have been 
particularly driven by preventative health (e.g., prenatal visits and weight checks) 
and reductions in malnutrition.
We find that the incentives primarily seem to be speeding up impacts on the tar-
geted indicators rather than changing ultimate long-run outcomes. At 30 months, 
the differences between the incentivized and nonincentivized treatment areas are 
smaller and no longer statistically significant. This is not because the incentivized 
group ceased to perform, but rather because the nonincentivized group seems to 
have caught up with the incentivized group.
Other than the decline in malnutrition at 18 months, we find no evidence that ulti-
mate health outcomes differentially improved with incentives. In fact, the evidence 
suggests that while neonatal mortality (mortality in 0–28 days) declined in the non-
incentivized group relative to controls at both 18 and 30 months, the decline in the 
incentivized group that was present at 18 months did not persist at 30 months. The fact 
that reductions in neonatal mortality did not persist with incentives could be an indi-
cator of multitasking problems (e.g., midwives in the incentivized group performed 
more prenatal care visits and weight checks, which were monitored, but perhaps lower 
quality prenatal care), or it could be because the improvements in prenatal care and 
maternal nutrition led some pregnancies that would have ended in miscarriage to sur-
vive through to birth, decreasing the health of those who survive to be born (Huang et 
al. 2013; Valente 2013). We cannot definitely distinguish between these hypotheses.
With respect to education, while the block grant program overall improved enroll-
ments at 30 months, there were no differences between incentivized and nonincen-
tivized areas on the 4 education indicators examined (primary and junior secondary 
enrollment and attendance) in either survey round. One reason for this may be that 
in the first year of the program, the program’s funding became available after the 
school year had already started, so it was too late to affect enrollments.
We find evidence for two channels through which the incentives may have had an 
impact. First, we find that incentives led to an increase in the labor supply of midwives, 
who are the major providers of the preventative care services we saw increase (e.g., 
prenatal care, regular weight checks for children). By contrast, we found no change 
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in labor supplied by teachers. One possible explanation is that midwives are paid on a 
fee-for-service basis for many services they provide, whereas teachers are not.
Second, the incentives led to what looks like a more efficient use of funds. We 
find that the incentives led to a reallocation of funds away from education supplies 
(5 percentage points lower, or about 21 percent) and toward health expenditures 
(3  percentage points higher, or about 7 percent). Yet, despite the reallocation of 
funds away from school supplies and uniforms, households were no less likely to 
receive these items, and were, in fact, more likely to receive scholarships. We find no 
changes in community effort or the targeting of benefits within villages.
Explicit performance incentives have many potential disadvantages. As discussed 
above, we find that the incentives led to less of a reduction in neonatal mortality 
compared to the nonincentivized group, which could be indicative of multitasking 
problems. Otherwise, though, we find no evidence of a multitasking problem across 
a very wide array of measures we investigate. We also find no evidence that immuni-
zation or school attendance records were manipulated in performance zones relative 
to nonperformance incentive zones. In fact, we find more accurate record keeping in 
incentivized areas, where the records were actually being used. And, we find that the 
fact that incentive payments were relative to other villages in the same subdistrict 
prevented the incentives from resulting in a net transfer of funds to richer villages. 
Of course, the incentives studied here represented only 20 percent of the total funds 
available, and it is possible that these negative effects might only have emerged with 
even stronger incentives.
In sum, we find that providing incentives increased the speed with which impacts 
appeared on several targeted health indicators. We find no improvements on mea-
sured health and education outcomes due to the incentives through 30 months. An 
important mechanism appears to be the reallocation of budgets, suggesting that 
incentives may be more effective when implemented at a high enough geographic 
level to allow budgetary flexibility.
This study is part of a recent literature on performance incentives for health and 
education in developing countries.1 The present study is unique in that incentives 
are provided to an entire community, and the performance incentives influenced the 
amount of future aid. This allows for flexibility in budgetary responses to the aid, 
which is an important channel for the type of performance-based aid to governments 
being considered at the more macro level.
The results are also related to the literature on the effectiveness of block grants 
(Musgrave 1997; Das et al. 2013). Most studies of conditional block grants moti-
vate the conditionality concerns about interjurisdictional spillovers, where the 
conditionality or matching grant forces the local government to internalize the 
externalities (Oates 1999). In this case, instead, the idea of the incentives is more 
1 Baird, McIntosh, and Özler (2011) find that adding conditions to a household-based Conditional Cash Transfer 
program in Malawi reduced school dropouts and improved English comprehension. In health, Basinga et al. (2011), 
find that pay-for-performance for health clinics in Rwanda yields positive impacts of performance incentives on 
institutional deliveries, preventive health visits for young children, and quality of prenatal care, but not on the 
quantity of prenatal care or immunizations. In education, a recent series of papers studies the effects of incentives 
given to teachers and compares them to unincentivized block grants (Muralidharan and Sundararaman 2011; Das 
et al. 2013).
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analogous to a principal-agent problem: the national government uses incentives 
in funding to incentivize local government in situations where the local govern-
ment has control rights, much in the way the US federal government ties highway 
fund block grants to requirements about the minimum drinking age. While this 
approach is frequently used as a way of incentivizing local governments, there 
is relatively little rigorous evidence on its effectiveness (Baicker, Clemens, and 
Singhal 2012).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section  I discusses the 
design of the program and incentives, the experimental design, and the econometric 
approach. Section II presents the main results of the impact of the incentives on 
the 12 targeted indicators. Section III examines the mechanisms through which the 
incentives may have acted, and Section IV examines the potential adverse effects of 
incentives. Section V concludes with a discussion of how the potential benefits of 
incentives compare with the costs of collecting and administering them.
I. Program and Experimental Design
A. the Generasi program
The program we study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first health and edu-
cation program worldwide that combines community block grants with explicit 
performance bonuses for communities. The program, known formally as program 
nasional pemberdayaan masyarakat—Generasi Sehat dan cerdas (National 
Community Empowerment Program—Healthy and Smart Generation; henceforth 
Generasi ) began in mid-2007 in 129 subdistricts in rural areas of 5 Indonesian prov-
inces: West Java, East Java, North Sulawesi, Gorontalo, and Nusa Tenggara Timur. 
In the program’s second year, which began in mid-2008, the program expanded 
to cover a total of 2,120 villages in a total of 176 subdistricts, with a total annual 
budget of US$44 million, funded through a mix of Indonesian government budget 
appropriations, World Bank, and donor country support.
The program is oriented around the 12 indicators of maternal and child health 
behavior and educational behavior shown in column 1 of Table 1. These indicators 
were chosen by the government to be similar to the conditions for a conditional cash 
transfer being piloted at the same time (but in different locations), and are in the 
same spirit as those used by other CCTs, such as Mexico’s progresa (Gertler 2004; 
Schultz 2004; Levy 2006). These 12 indicators represent behaviors that are within 
the direct control of villagers, such as immunizations, prenatal and postnatal care, 
and school enrollment and attendance, rather than long-term outcomes, such as test 
scores or infant mortality.
Each year all participating villages receive a block grant. Block grants are usable 
for any purpose that the village can claim might help address 1 of the 12 indicators 
shown in Table 1, including, but not limited to, hiring extra midwives for the vil-
lage, subsidizing the costs of prenatal and postnatal care, providing supplementary 
feeding, hiring extra teachers, opening a branch school in the village, providing 
scholarships, providing school uniforms, providing transportation funds, or improv-
ing health or school buildings. The block grants averaged US$8,500 in the first 
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year of the program and US$13,500 in the second year of the program, or about 
US$2.70–US$4.30 per person living in treatment villages in the target age ranges.
To decide on the allocation of the funds, trained facilitators help each village 
elect an 11-member village management team, as well as select local facilitators and 
volunteers. This management team usually consists of villagers active in health and 
education issues, such as volunteers from monthly neighborhood child and maternal 
health meetings. Through social mapping and in-depth discussion groups, villag-
ers identify problems and bottlenecks in reaching the 12 indicators. Inter-village 
meetings and consultation with local health and education service providers allow 
the team to obtain information, technical assistance, and support. Following these 
discussions, the 11-member management team makes the final budget allocation.
B. performance Incentives
The size of a village’s block grant depends on its performance on the 12 tar-
geted indicators in the previous year. The purpose is to increase the village’s effort 
toward achieving the targeted indicators (Holmstrom 1979), both by encouraging 
a more effective allocation of funds and by stimulating village outreach efforts to 
encourage mothers and children to obtain appropriate health care and increase edu-
cational enrollment and attendance. The performance bonus is structured as relative 
competition between villages within the same subdistrict (kecamatan). By making 
the performance bonuses relative to other local villages, the government sought to 
minimize the impact of unobserved differences in the capabilities of different areas 
on the performance bonuses (Lazear and Rosen 1981; Mookherjee 1984; Gibbons 
and Murphy 1990) and to avoid funds flowing toward richer areas. We discuss the 
impact of the relative bonus scheme in Section IVC below.
The rule for allocating funds is as follows. The size of the overall block grant allo-
cation for the entire subdistrict is fixed by the subdistrict’s population and province. 
Table 1—Generasi Program Target Indicators and Weights
Performance metric
Weight per measured 
achievement
Potential times per 
person per year
Potential points per 
person per year
1. Prenatal care visit 12 4 48
2. Iron tablets (30 pill packet) 7 3 21
3. Childbirth assisted by trained professional 100 1 100
4. Postnatal care visit 25 2 50
5. Immunizations 4 12 48
6. Monthly weight increases 4 12 48
7. Weight check 2 12 24
8. Vitamin A pill 10 2 20
9. Primary enrollment 25 1 25
10. Monthly primary attendance >= 85% 2 12 24
11. Middle school enrollment 50 1 50
12. Monthly middle school attendance >= 85% 5 12 60
note: This table shows the 12 indicators used in the Generasi program, along with the weights assigned by the 
program in calculating bonus points.
VoL. 6 no. 4 7Olken et al.: ShOuld aid RewaRd PeRfORmance?
Within a subdistrict, in year one, funds are divided among villages in proportion to the 
number of target beneficiaries in each village (i.e., the number of children of varying 
ages and the expected number of pregnant women). Starting in year two, 80 percent 
of the subdistrict’s funds continue to be divided among villages in proportion to the 
number of target beneficiaries. The remaining 20 percent of the subdistrict’s funds 
form a performance bonus pool, divided among villages based on performance on the 
12 indicators. The bonus pool is allocated in proportion to a weighted sum of each vil-
lage’s performance above a predicted minimum achievement level, i.e.,
  ShareofBonu s v =   p v  _  ∑ j=1 n  p j 
 where  p v =  ∑ 
i=1
I
 w i max[  y vi −  m vi ,0],
where yvi represents village v’s performance on indicator i, wi represents the weight 
for indicator i, mvi represents the predicted minimum achievement level for village v 
and indicator i, and pv is the total number of bonus “points” earned by village v. 
The minimums (mvi ) were set at 70 percent of the predicted level, so that virtually 
all villages would be “in the money” and face linear incentives on all 12 indicators. 
The weights, wi, were set by the government to be approximately proportional to 
the marginal cost of having an additional individual complete indicator i, and are 
shown in Table 1. Simple spreadsheets were created to help villagers understand the 
formulas. Additional details can be found in online Appendix 1.
To monitor achievement of the health indicators, facilitators collect data from 
health providers and community health workers on the amount of each type of ser-
vice provided. School enrollment and attendance data are obtained from the official 
school register.2
C. the nonincentivized Group
As discussed above, two versions of the program were implemented to sepa-
rate the impact of the performance incentives per se from the overall impact of the 
block grant program: the program with performance bonuses (referred to as “incen-
tivized”), and an identical program without performance bonuses (referred to as 
“nonincentivized”). The nonincentivized version is absolutely identical to the incen-
tivized version except that in the nonincentivized version, there is no performance 
bonus pool; instead, in all years, 100 percent of funds are divided among villages 
in proportion to the number of target beneficiaries in each village. Since each entire 
subdistrict is either entirely incentivized or entirely nonincentivized, and since the 
total amount of funds per subdistrict is fixed in advance and is the same regardless 
2 Obtaining attendance data from the official school register is not a perfect measure, since it is possible that 
teachers could manipulate student attendance records to ensure they cross the 85 percent threshold (Linden and 
Shastry 2012). While more objective measures of monitoring attendance were considered, such as taking daily 
photos of students (as in Duflo, Hanna, and Ryan 2012) or installing fingerprint readers in all schools (Express India 
News Service 2008), the program decided not to adopt these more objective measures due to their cost and logistical 
complexity. We test for this type of differential manipulation in Section IVB.
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of whether the subdistrict is incentivized, the expected amount of resources a village 
obtains is unaffected by incentives.
In all other respects, the two versions of the program are identical: the total 
amount of funds allocated to each subdistrict is the same in both versions, the same 
communication materials and indicators are used, the same procedures are used 
to pick village budget allocations, and the same monitoring tools and scoring sys-
tem are used. Even the annual point score of villages pv is also calculated in non- 
incentivized areas and discussed in comparison to other villages in the community, 
but as an end-of-year monitoring and evaluation tool, not to allocate funds. The fact 
that monitoring is identical was an experimental design choice made to precisely 
isolate the impact of financial performance incentives, holding monitoring constant.
D. Experimental design and data
Project locations were selected by lottery to form a randomized, controlled field 
experiment. The randomization was conducted at the subdistrict (kecamatan) level, 
so all villages within a subdistrict either received the same version (either all incen-
tivized or all nonincentivized) or were in the control group. Since some services 
(e.g., health services, junior secondary schools) service multiple villages within the 
same subdistrict, but rarely serve people from other subdistricts, randomizing at the 
subdistrict level and treating all villages within the subdistrict estimates the pro-
gram’s true net impact, rather than possible reallocations among villages. A total of 
264 eligible subdistricts were randomized into either 1 of the 2 treatment groups or 
the control group. Details can be found in online Appendix 2.
The program was phased in over 2 years, with 127 treatment subdistricts in year 1 
and 174 treatment subdistricts in year 2. In year one, for logistical reasons, the gov-
ernment prioritized those subdistricts that had previously received the regular village 
infrastructure program (denoted group P). Since we observe group P status in treat-
ment as well as control, we control for group P status (interacted with time fixed 
effects) in the experimental analysis to ensure we use only the variation induced by 
the lottery. By year 2 (2008), 96 percent of eligible subdistricts—174 out of the 181 
eligible subdistricts randomized to receive the block grants—were receiving the pro-
gram. The remaining seven eligible districts received the regular PNPM village infra-
structure program instead.3 Conditional on receiving the program, compliance with 
the incentivized or nonincentivized randomization was 100 percent.
The phase-in and allocation is shown in Table 2. In all analysis, we report intent-
to-treat estimates based on the computer randomization we conducted among the 
264 eligible subdistricts and the prioritization rule specified by the government. 
A balance check against baseline variables is discussed in online Appendix 3 and 
shown in online Appendix Table 1.
The main dataset we examine is a set of three waves of surveys of households, 
village officials, health service providers, and school officials. Wave I, the baseline 
3 We do not know why these seven districts received regular PNPM rather than Generasi. We therefore include 
them in the treatment group as if they had received the program, and interpret the resulting estimates as intent-to-treat 
estimates. Online Appendix Table 2 shows that controlling receipt of traditional PNPM does not affect the results.
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round, was conducted from June to August 2007, prior to implementation.4 Wave II, 
the first follow-up survey, was conducted from October to December 2008, about 
18 months after the program began. Wave III was conducted from October 2009 
to January 2010, about 30 months after the program began. Approximately 12,000 
households were interviewed in each survey wave, as well as more than 8,000 vil-
lage officials and health and education providers. Within each subdistrict we sampled 
5 households from each of 8 villages, for a total of 40 households per subdistrict. 
Households were selected from a stratified random sample, with the strata consisting 
of those households with a pregnant woman or mother who had given birth within 
the past 24 months; households with children under age 15 but not in the first group, 
and all other households. In the second and third waves, in 50 percent of villages, 
all households were followed up to form an individual panel, and in the remaining 
villages new households were selected. These surveys were designed by the authors 
and were conducted by the Center for Population and Policy Studies (CPPS) of the 
University of Gadjah Mada, Indonesia. This survey data is unrelated to the data col-
lected by the program for calculating performance bonuses, and was not explicitly 
linked to the program. Additional details can be found in online Appendix 4.
E. Estimation
Since the program was designed as a randomized experiment, the analysis is 
econometrically straightforward. We compare outcomes in subdistricts randomized 
to be treatments with subdistricts randomized to be controls, controlling for out-
comes at baseline.
We restrict attention to the 264 “eligible” subdistricts, as above, and use the ran-
domization results combined with the government’s prioritization rule to construct 
4 Note that in a very small number of villages, the Generasi program field preparations may have begun prior 
to the baseline survey being completed. We have verified that the main results are unaltered if we do not use the 
baseline data in these villages. See online Appendix Table 2, column 10.





P NP P NP P NP Total
Total subdistricts in initial  
 randomization
61 39 55 45 55 45 300
Total eligible subdistricts 57 36 48 40 46 37 264
Eligible and received Generasi in:
 2007 57 10 48 12 0 0 127
 2008 57 33 48 36 0 0 174
notes: This table shows the randomization and actual program implementation. P indicates the subdistricts that 
were ex ante prioritized to receive Generasi in 2007 should they be randomly selected for the program; after the 
priority areas were given the program, a second lottery was held to select which NP subdistricts randomly selected 
to receive the program should receive it starting in 2007. The randomization results are shown in the columns 
(Incentivized Generasi, Nonincentivized Generasi, and Control). Actual implementation status is shown in the 
rows. Note that conditional in receiving the program, the randomization into the incentivized or nonincentivized 
version of the program was always perfectly followed.
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our treatment variables. Specifically, analyzing Wave II data (corresponding to the 
first treatment year), we define BLocKGRAntS to be a dummy with value 1 if the 
subdistrict was randomized to receive either version of the block grants, and either 
it was in the priority area (group P) or was in the nonpriority area and selected in 
an additional lottery to receive the program in 2007. In analyzing Wave III data, 
we define BLocKGRAntS to be a dummy that takes value 1 if the subdistrict was 
randomized to receive either version of the block grants. We define IncEntIVES 
to be a dummy with value 1 if BLocKGRAntS is 1 and if the subdistrict was ran-
domized to be in the incentivized version. IncEntIVES captures the additional 
effect of the incentives beyond the main effect of having the program, and is the key 
variable of interest in the paper. These variables capture the intent-to-treat effect of 
the program, and since the lottery results were very closely followed—they predict 
true program implementation in 99 percent of subdistricts in 2007 and 96 percent 
of subdistricts in 2008—they will be very close to the true effect of the treatment on 
the treated (Imbens and Angrist 1994).
We control for the subdistrict baseline average level of the outcome variable, and 
the preperiod outcome variable for those who have it, as well as a dummy variable 
for having nonmissing preperiod values. Since households came from 1 of 3 differ-
ent samples (those with a child under 2, those with a child age 2–15 but not in the 
first group, and all others; see online Appendix 4), we sample type dummies, inter-
acted with whether it is a panel village, and for all child-level variables, we include 
age dummies. We, thus, estimate the following regressions.
Wave II data:
(1)  y pdsi2 =  α d +  β 1 BLocKGRAnt S pds2 
  +  β 2 IncEntIVE S pds2 +  γ 1 ypdsi1 +  γ 2 1  { y pdsi1 ≠ missing }  + γ3  _ ypds1
  + SAmpL E pdsi +  α p ×  p pds +  ε pdsi 
Wave III data:
(2) ypdsi3 =  α d +  β 1 BLocKGRAnt S pds3 
  +  β 2 IncEntIVE S pds3 +  γ 1 ypdsi1 +  γ 2 1  { y pdsi1 ≠ missing }  +  γ 3  _ ypds1
  + SAmpL E pdsi +  α p ×  p pds +  ε pdsi ,
where i is an individual respondent, p is a province, d is a district, s is a subdistrict, 
t is the survey wave, ypdsit is the outcome in Wave t,  α d is a district fixed effect, ypdsi1 
is the baseline value for individual i (assuming that this is a panel household, and 0 
if it is not a panel household),  1  { y pdsi1 ≠ missin g }  is panel household dummy,  _  y pds1 is the 
average baseline value for the subdistrict, SAmpLE are sample type dummies inter-
acted with being a panel household, and  α p × ps are province-specific dummies 
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for having had prior community-driven development experience through the PNPM 
program. We also report pooled results across the two waves in the online Appendix. 
Standard errors are clustered at the subdistrict level.
The key coefficient of interest is β2, which estimates the difference between the 
incentivized and nonincentivized program. We also calculate the total impact of the 
incentivized version of the program (vis-à-vis pure controls) by adding the coeffi-
cients on IncEntIVES and BLocKGRAntS. We discuss additional specifications 
for robustness in Section II.
Since we have many indicators, to estimate joint significance we calculate aver-
age standardized effects for each family of indicators, following Kling, Liebman, 
and Katz (2007). For each indicator i, define  σ i 2 to be the variance of i. We estimate (1) for each indicator, but run the regressions jointly, clustering the standard errors 
by subdistrict to allow for arbitrary correlation among the errors across equations 
within subdistricts both between and across indicators. We define the average stan-
dardized effect as  1 _ n  ∑ i    β i  _  σ i . Following our preanalysis plan, these average standard-
ized effects are the main way we handle multiple inference problems.
Since we also are interested in which individual indicators drive effects, in addi-
tion to reporting standard p-values for each indicator, we implemented family-wise 
errors rates (FWER) using the stepwise procedure of Romano and Wolf (2005) 
and report the results in the table notes. The FWER uses a bootstrap-based method 
to calculate which hypotheses would be rejected, taking into account the fact that 
multiple hypotheses are being tested within a given family. We report, in the notes 
to each table, which individual hypotheses are still rejected once family-wise error 
rates are taken into account within each family of indicators.
Note that all of the analysis presented here (regression specifications including 
control variables, outcome variables, and aggregate effects) follows an analysis plan 
that was finalized in April 2009 for the Wave II data (before we examined any of the 
Wave II data) and in January 2010 (before we examined any of the Wave III data). 
These hypothesis documents were registered with the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty 
Action Lab at MIT.5
II. Main Results on Targeted Outcomes
A. overall Impact on targeted Indicators
Table 3 presents the results on the 12 targeted indicators. Each row presents three 
separate regressions. Column 1 shows the baseline mean of the variable. Columns 2– 4 
show the Wave II survey results (after 18 months of program implementation) from 
equation (1); columns 5–7 show the Wave III results estimated using equation (2). For 
each specification, we show the total treatment effect in incentive areas (the sum of 
5 The hypotheses documents, showing the date they were archived, are publicly available at http://www.poverty-
actionlab.org/Hypothesis-Registry. A full set of tables that correspond to the Wave III analysis plan can be found in 
the full Generasi impact evaluation report (Olken, Onishi, and Wong 2011), available at http://goo.gl/TudhZ. Other 
recent economics papers using these types of prespecified analysis plans include Alatas et al. (2012); Finkelstein et 
al. (2012); and Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel (2012).
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the coefficients on BLocKGRAntS and IncEntIVES), the total treatment effect in 
nonincentive areas (the coefficient on BLocKGRAntS), and the  additional treatment 
effect due to the incentives (the coefficient on IncEntIVES ). We first present the 
eight health indicators, along with the average standardized effect for those indicators. 
We then present the 4 education indicators with standardized effect, and then the over-
all standardized effect for all 12 indicators. The final three rows show the impact on 
total “bonus points,” where the 12 indicators are weighted using the weights in Table 1 
and an estimate for the number of affected households (using the same estimated 
number of households in both treatment groups). All data is from household surveys.
We begin by examining the average standardized effects. Focusing first on the 
Wave  II (18 month) results, the average standardized effect among the 8 health 
Table 3—Impact on Targeted Outcomes
































Number prenatal visits 7.451 0.333 −0.274 0.608*** 0.162 −0.018 0.180
[4.292] (0.234) (0.201) (0.220) (0.192) (0.188) (0.173)
Delivery by trained midwife 0.673 0.037 0.040 −0.004 0.012 −0.008 0.019
[0.469] (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.021) (0.023) (0.021)
Number of postnatal visits 1.734 −0.160 −0.056 −0.104 −0.028 −0.024 −0.004
[2.465] (0.140) (0.120) (0.140) (0.129) (0.124) (0.129)
Iron tablet sachets 1.587 0.130 0.051 0.078 0.076 0.045 0.031
[1.255] (0.084) (0.081) (0.081) (0.058) (0.065) (0.063)
Percent of immunization 0.654 0.027 0.012 0.015 0.010 −0.006 0.016
[0.366] (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
Number of weight checks 2.127 0.164*** 0.069 0.096* 0.176*** 0.199*** −0.024
[1.189] (0.052) (0.049) (0.054) (0.055) (0.052) (0.051)
Number Vitamin A 1.528 −0.008 0.005 −0.013 0.085* 0.002 0.082
 Supplements [1.136] (0.052) (0.055) (0.058) (0.048) (0.054) (0.053)
Percent malnourished 0.168 −0.016 0.011 −0.027* −0.017 −0.026* 0.009
[0.374] (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)















Age 7–12 participation rate 0.948 −0.001 0.003 −0.004 0.005 0.011*** −0.006
[0.222] (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Age 13–15 participation rate 0.823 −0.034* −0.050** 0.016 0.020 0.013 0.007
[0.382] (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.017) (0.016) (0.014)
Age 7–12 gross attendance 0.904 0.001 0.002 −0.001 0.003 0.004 −0.001
[0.277] (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Age 13–15 gross attendance 0.769 −0.040* −0.065*** 0.025 0.026 0.016 0.010
[0.412] (0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015)
Average standardized effect −0.062 −0.090** 0.027 0.048 0.045* 0.003
 education (0.039) (0.045) (0.045) (0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
(continued )
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 indicators is 0.04 standard deviations higher in the incentivized group than in the 
nonincentivized control group (statistically significant at the 10 percent level). 
There are no statistically detectable impacts on education or overall (though the 
overall effect has a p-value of 0.12).
To understand what may be driving the impact on health indicators, we examine 
the indicators one by one, and find differential effects of the incentives on 3 of 12 
indicators (column 4). Two of the 3 indicators that respond appear to be  preventative 
care: prenatal care (increased by 0.61 visits, or 8.2 percent of the baseline mean) and 
regular monthly weight checks for under-5 year olds (increased by 0.096 over the 
previous 3 months, or about 4.5 percent of the baseline mean). When we apply the 
FWER multiple-hypothesis testing correction, the only coefficient that is still statis-
tically significant is prenatal visits, which is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level even taking into account the multiple hypothesis testing.
One reason preventative care may be responsive is that it is largely conducted 
at posyandus, the neighborhood village health posts where mothers and children 
gather monthly to get their children weighed and receive preventative care (usu-
ally provided by village midwives). These meetings are organized by community 
































Average standardized effect 0.016 −0.021 0.036 0.051** 0.033* 0.018
Overall (0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019)
panel d. calculation of total points
Total points 0.698 −1.638 2.336* 2.889** 2.150* 0.738
 (millions) (1.376) (1.263) (1.414) (1.249) (1.152) (1.176)
Total points health 1.941** 0.206 1.735* 1.962** 1.388 0.574
 (millions) (0.987) (0.933) (1.005) (0.985) (0.982) (0.969)
Total points education −1.243* −1.844** 0.601 0.927 0.762 0.165
 (millions) (0.710) (0.822) (0.836) (0.585) (0.553) (0.516)
notes: Data is from the household survey. Column 1 shows the baseline mean of the variable shown, with standard 
deviations in brackets. Each row of columns 2–4 and 5–7 shows coefficients from a regression of the variable shown 
on an incentive treatment dummy, a nonincentive treatment dummy, district fixed effects, province × group P fixed 
effects, and baseline means, as described in the text. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at 
the subdistrict level. In columns 2–4 the treatment variable is defined based on year one program placement, and in 
columns 5–7 it is defined based on year two program placement. All treatment variables are defined using the original 
randomizations combined with eligibility rules, rather than actual program implementation, and so are interpretable 
as intent-to-treat estimates. Columns 4 and 7 are the calculated difference between the previous two columns. Average 
standardized effects and total points reported in the bottom rows are calculated using the estimated coefficients from 
the 12 individual regressions above using the formula shown in the text, adjusted for arbitrary cross-equation cluster-
ing of standard errors within subdistricts. Applying family-wise error rates (Romano and Wolf 2005) to the incentive 
additional effect (columns 4, 7, and 10), the only coefficient where the null is rejected, taking into account multiple 
comparisons, is prenatal visits in Wave II, which is rejected at the 10 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 3—Impact on Targeted Outcomes (continued )
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 volunteers. Since many of these volunteers may have been involved in managing the 
block grant program, they may have been particularly responsive to the incentives.
The other indicator that responds is malnutrition, defined as being more than 
2 standard deviations below the weight-for-age normal z-score for children under 
three. This is measured directly by the survey teams, who brought scales and inde-
pendently weighed children at home. Malnutrition is 2.6 percentage points (15 per-
cent) lower in the incentivized group than in the nonincentivized group, though this 
coefficient is not statistically significant once we take into account multiple hypoth-
esis testing. Since the purpose of regular weight checks for children is precisely to 
identify those who are not growing properly so that they can receive supplemental 
nutrition, it is not surprising that an impact on improving regular weight monthly 
checks for children in turn leads to fewer children who are severely underweight.
The results in Wave III, after 30 months of the program, are more muted, show-
ing no statistically significant differences between incentivized and nonincentivized. 
Closer inspection suggests that most of the changes from Wave II are driven by 
the nonincentivized group improving, rather than the incentivized group declining. 
For example, columns 5 and 6, which show the incentivized and nonincentivized 
groups relative to pure controls, show that in Wave III, the nonincentivized group 
saw improvements in weight checks and malnutrition of similar magnitude to the 
incentivized group.6 This suggests that the main impact of the incentives was to speed 
up the impacts of the program on preventative care and malnutrition, rather than on 
changing the ultimate long-run impacts of the programs on the targeted indicators.
No effects of the incentives were seen on education in either wave. In both incentiv-
ized and nonincentivized areas, age 13–15 participation and attendance fell relative 
to controls in Wave II, and age 7–12 participation increased in Wave III. Consistent 
with this, the average standardized effects for education for both incentivized and 
nonincentivized areas decreased in Wave II and increased in Wave III.7 One reason 
enrollments did not increase until the second year of program  implementation (i.e., 
Wave III) is that the program did not disburse money until after the school year had 
begun, so it was structurally very unlikely to generate effects until the subsequent 
school year (though the fact that enrollments actually declined in Wave II in both 
incentivized and nonincentivized groups relative to pure control is something of a 
mystery). Overall, this was a period when enrollments were increasing dramatically 
throughout Indonesia, so enrollments increased everywhere relative to baseline.
The average standardized effects weight the indicators by the control groups’ stan-
dard deviations of the relevant variables. An alternative approach is to use the weights 
used by the program in calculating bonus payments. This approach has the advantage 
6 To test the changes over time more directly, online Appendix Table 6 restricts the sample to those subdistricts 
that were either treated both years or control both years (i.e., drops those subdistricts where treatment started in 
the second year). Columns 7 and 8 show the differences between the impact in Wave II and the impact in Wave 
III relative to control, and column 9 shows the difference between the incentive effect in Wave II and Wave III. 
Online Appendix Table 6 shows that the decline in the incentive effect of weight checks (due to the increase in the 
nonincentivized group) is statistically significant, while the decline in malnutrition is not statistically significant.
7 In particular, if we pool incentive and nonincentivized treatments, the change in 7–12 participation and the 
education average standardized effects become statistically significant. We also find a statistically significant 4 per-
centage point (6 percent) improvement in the percentage of people age 13–15 enrolled in middle school. These 
results are in Olken, Onishi, and Wong (2011).
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that it weights each indicator by the weight assigned to it by the government. For 
each indicator, we use the weights in Table 1, multiplied by the number of potential 
beneficiaries of each indicator (garnered from population data in different age ranges 
from the program’s internal management system, and using the same numbers for 
both treatment groups), and aggregate to determine the total number of “points” cre-
ated. The results show a similar story to the average standardized effects. In Wave II, 
89 percent of the program’s impact on health (in terms of points) can be attributed 
to the incentives, and the incentives had a statistically significant increase on both 
points from health and total points overall. In Wave III, 29 percent of the program’s 
impact on health (in terms of points) can be attributed to the incentives, though the 
Wave III difference is not statistically significant either for health or overall.
Although we prespecified equations (1) and (2) as the main regression specifica-
tions of interest, we have also considered a wide range of alternative specifications. 
Online Appendix Table 2 reports the coefficient on IncEntIVES—the equivalent 
of columns 4 and 7, as well as average effects across both waves—for specifica-
tions where we control for the baseline level of all 12 indicators instead of just 
the indicator in question, control only for subdistrict averages at baseline rather 
than also using individual baseline controls, include no controls, estimate using 
 first-differences rather than controlling for the baseline level, and run everything 
aggregated to the subdistrict, rather than using individual-level data. The results are 
very consistent with the main specification in Table 3.
B. Heterogeneity in Impact on targeted Indicators
We test whether incentives had a larger impact in areas with low baseline levels. 
The idea is that the marginal cost of improving achievement is higher if the baseline 
level is higher, e.g., moving from 98 percent to 99 percent enrollment rates is harder 
than moving from 80 percent to 81 percent.8 We re-estimate equations (1) and (2), 
interacting BLocKGRAntS and IncEntIVES with the mean value of the indicator 
in the subdistrict at baseline. The results are shown in Table 4 ( indicator-by-indicator 
results are in online Appendix Table 4). A negative interaction coefficient implies 
that the program was more effective in areas with worse baseline levels. For ease of 
interpretation, we also calculate the implied impacts at the tenth percentile of the 
baseline distribution.
The results confirm that the incentives were more effective in areas with 
lower baseline levels—the standardized interaction term of IncEntIVES × 
BASELInE_VALuE in columns 3 and 7 are negative and, in both Wave II and over-
all, statistically significant. To interpret the magnitude, note that, in Wave II, the 
incentives added 0.072 standard deviations to the health indicators at the tenth per-
centile of the baseline distribution. In Wave III, it was 0.061 standard deviations 
(not statistically significant). Pooled across the two waves, it was 0.065 standard 
deviations (statistically significant at 5 percent; results not shown). These effects are 
about double the average effect of the program shown in Table 3.
8 Note that this is the main dimension of heterogeneity we specified in the prespecified analysis plan.
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Consistent with the results in Table 4, we find that the incentives were more 
effective in the poorer, off-Java locations: on average across all waves, the total 
standardized effect for health was 0.11 standard deviations higher in incentivized 
areas than nonincentivized areas in NTT province relative to Java, and 0.14 standard 
deviations higher in incentivized areas than nonincentivized areas in Sulawesi rela-
tive to Java (see online Appendix Table 3). This is not surprising given the lower 
levels of baseline service delivery in these areas: malnutrition for under 3-year olds 
is 12.6 percent in Java, but 24.7 percent in NTT and 23.4 percent in Sulawesi. These 
results confirm the idea that the incentives were substantially more effective in areas 
with lower levels of baseline service provision.
C. Impacts on Health and Education outcomes
The 12 targeted outcomes of the program are, other than malnutrition, inputs to health 
and education—things like health-seeking behavior and educational enrollment and 
attendance—rather than actual metrics of health and education. To examine impacts 
on health, we measure anthropometrics in the household  survey ( malnourishment, 
measured being 2 or 3 standard deviations below normal in  weight-for-age; wasting, 
measured as being 2 or 3 standard deviations below normal in  weight-for-height; and 
stunting, measured as being 2 or 3 standard deviations below normal in  height-for-age), 
acute illness (prevalence of diarrhea or acute respiratory infections in the previous 
month), and mortality (neonatal and infant). To measure learning, we conducted 
 at-home tests of children on both reading in Bahasa Indonesia and in math, using test 
questions drawn from the standard Ministry of National Education test databank.
The results are presented in Table 5, and generally show no systematic improve-
ments in these indicators between the incentivized and nonincentivized group. In 
fact, neonatal mortality actually appears worse in Wave III in incentivized areas 
relative to nonincentivized areas.
Table 4—Interactions with Baseline Level of Service Delivery, Average Standardized Effects














































































































notes: See notes to Table 3. Data is from the household survey. Columns 1 and 5 interact the incentive treatment 
dummy with the baseline subdistrict mean of the variable shown, and columns 2 and 5 interact the nonincentive 
treatment dummy with the baseline subdistrict mean of the variable shown. Columns 3 and 7 are the difference 
between the two previous columns. Columns 4 and 8 show the estimated additional impact of incentives evaluated 
at the tenth percentile of the indicator at baseline. The indicator-by-indicator regressions corresponding to these 
average standardized effects are shown in online Appendix Table 4.
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As previously discussed, malnutrition is lower in the incentivized group in 
Wave II (though this is not statistically significant once one takes into account 
 family-wise error rates). In Wave III, after 30 months, the nonincentivized group 
also shows improvements in malnutrition, so there is no longer a difference between 
them. Height-based anthropometrics, which were measured in Wave III only, show 
no systematic differences. It is also worth noting that the weight-for-age z-score 
is not statistically significantly different, suggesting that the malnutrition result is 
being driven by changes at the very bottom of the distribution (consistent with a 
program that targets highly malnourished children).
With respect to mortality, neonatal mortality fell in both incentivized and non-
incentive areas relative to control in Wave II, by about six deaths per thousand. In 
Wave III, however, it was lower only in nonincentive areas (by about eight deaths 
per thousand), and there was no decline in mortality in incentivized areas compared 
Table 5—Impacts on Nutrition, Mortality, and Test Scores
































Malnourished (0–3 years) 0.168 −0.016 0.011 −0.027* −0.017 −0.026* 0.009
[0.006] (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016)














Weight for age z-score −0.841 −0.016 −0.017 0.001 0.056 0.067 −0.010
[0.020] (0.050) (0.046) (0.052) (0.052) (0.050) (0.048)
Wasting (0–3 years) 0.124 −0.005 0.003 −0.008
[0.006] (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
Severe wasting (0–3 years) 0.048 0.000 0.006 −0.006
[0.004] (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Weight for height z-score −0.066 0.032 0.135 −0.103
[0.030] (0.081) (0.084) (0.089)
Stunting (0–3 years) 0.383 0.034* 0.027 0.006
[0.008] (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Severe stunting (0–3 years) 0.206 −0.007 0.019 −0.026
[0.007] (0.019) (0.019) (0.018)
Height for age z-score −1.369 0.052 −0.013 0.066
[0.035] (0.096) (0.093) (0.098)
Diarrhea or ARI 0.356 −0.026 0.012 −0.038 0.003 −0.003 0.006
[0.008] (0.023) (0.020) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.019)
Neonatal mortality (0–28 days) 











Infant mortality (1–12 months) 
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to control. The results in column 7 therefore suggest greater mortality in the incen-
tivized areas relative to the nonincentivized areas. The difference in neonatal mor-
tality between incentivized and nonincentivized areas survives multiple hypothesis 
testing corrections. The results suggest that the difference in Wave III is entirely in 
neonatal mortality (mortality during the first 28 days), as there is no difference in 
infant mortality (mortality from 1 to 12 months). In fact, of the 14 neonatal deaths 
that occur in the incentivized group, 10 of them occur within the 1 day after birth, 
suggesting that the increase is being driven almost entirely by these early deaths 
within 24 hours of birth.
The fact that the decline in infant mortality in Wave III only occurs in nonincen-
tivized areas is a puzzle. There are two possible interpretations. One interpretation 
































Home-based Bahasa test  























































Average standardized  
















notes: See notes to Table 3. Data is from the household survey. Test scores were conducted at home as part of the 
household survey. Note that for computing average standardized effects, we multiply the health variables by −1, 
so that all coefficients are defined so that improvements in health or education are positive numbers. Average stan-
dardized effects do not include infant mortality (1–12 months), weight for age z-score, weight for height z-score, 
and height for age z-score, as these variables were not specified in the preanalysis plan. Applying family-wise error 
rates (Romano and Wolf 2005) to the incentive additional effect (columns 4 and 7), in Wave III, 0–28 day mortality 
is rejected at the 5 percent level in the family of all indicators, and 0–28 day and 0–12 month mortality are rejected 
in the health comparison at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 5—Impacts on Nutrition, Mortality, and Test Scores (continued )
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is that this is evidence of a multitasking problem. For example, perhaps quantity of 
prenatal services increased but quality of prenatal services decreased. We know, for 
example, that midwives performed many more weight checks and prenatal visits in 
the incentivized areas relative to the nonincentivized areas, so it is possible that this 
extra effort on incentivized indicators crowded out other important dimensions of 
prenatal care. The results on quality of prenatal care presented below suggest this is 
not an issue so far as we can measure quality, but it is possible there is an unobserved 
dimension of quality that we cannot measure.
A second interpretation is that this increase in neonatal mortality is a con-
sequence of the fact that the increase in prenatal care in incentive areas, which 
occurred in Wave II, led to an increase in marginal pregnancies actually surviving to 
become live births, which, in turn, counteracted the initial improvement in mortali-
ty.9 Unfortunately, data on miscarriages are unreliable, and many of the potentially 
vulnerable early-stage pregnancies are not even detected, so one cannot directly 
test this hypothesis.10 One therefore cannot know for sure whether these additional 
early births represent a decline in miscarriages and, hence, an improvement in health 
(births carried to term that would otherwise have miscarried), or instead represent 
births that are somehow being delivered earlier than they would have (and, hence, a 
deterioration of health), so it is not possible to fully distinguish between these two 
alternative interpretations of these results.11
D. discussion
These results suggest that the incentives’ main impact was to accelerate perfor-
mance improvements on preventative care (e.g., prenatal care and regular weight 
9 This latter hypothesis, that improvements in prenatal care can negatively affect the health of the born popula-
tion because marginal pregnancies are carried to term rather than resulting in miscarriage, is related to Bozzoli, 
Deaton, and Quintana-Domeque (2009), who investigate the link between adult height and childhood disease, and 
Gørgens, Meng, and Vaithianathan (2012), who study stunting and selection effects of the 1959–1961 Chinese 
famine. The closest papers that pay particular attention to selection effects occurring through early miscarriage 
(i.e., in utero selection versus selection via early childhood mortality) are Huang et al. (2012), which studies this 
issue in the context of the Chinese famine, and Valente (2013), which studies the impact of civil conflict in Nepal.
10 We do ask about miscarriage rates in our survey, and find that there is no statistically significant difference in 
stillbirth rates in our survey between incentivized and nonincentivized treatments. However, it is important to note 
that most of the change in marginal births may be coming from very early (e.g., first trimester) miscarriages, which 
are associated with maternal nutrition and stress (Almond and Mazumder 2011). These types of early miscarriages 
appear to be grossly underreported in our data (and many may not even be detected), so it is not surprising we do 
not find an effect in the data.
11 While it is not possible to definitively determine which hypothesis is behind the results, there are several pieces 
of evidence that suggests that this latter hypothesis is at least plausible in this context. First, as noted above, it is 
important to note that all of the mortality effects we find are driven by neonatal mortality—0 to 28 days—and virtu-
ally all are driven by the first day after birth. This is consistent with the idea that these increased deaths are related to 
fragile newborns. Second, there is a statistically significant decline in gestational age associated with the incentive 
treatment, of about 0.4 weeks. (See online Appendix Table 14.) This is driven by premature births: live births less 
than 37 weeks are 3.1 percentage points more likely and live births less than 36 weeks are 2.1 percentage points more 
likely in the incentive treatment. These early live births, in turn, drive the neonatal (under 28 day) mortality—80 per-
cent of the mortality increase is associated with births less than 37 weeks and 50 percent of the mortality increase is 
associated with births less than 36 weeks. Combined, this suggests a link between earlier births and the increase in 
mortality. We also find that mothers in the incentivized areas reported being more likely to receive prenatal informa-
tion about maternal nutrition. (See online Appendix Table 14.) Since maternal nutrition is a key link in the inutero 
selection effects documented elsewhere (e.g., Almond and Mazumder 2011; Huang et al. 2013), all these facts are 
consistent with the idea that there was a change in the selection margin in the incentivized areas. Nevertheless, since 
we do not observe these “missing births” directly in the control group, it is difficult to know for sure.
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checks for young children). One reason both prenatal care and weight checks may 
be particularly responsive is that they are organized by community members at 
monthly neighborhood primary care sessions, and many of these same community 
members were involved in managing the block grants and may have been particu-
larly attuned to the incentives. While some effects are substantial (16 percent reduc-
tion in malnutrition rates from baseline in just 18 months), when we consider all 8 
health indicators together, the average standardized effect is a modest 0.04 standard 
deviations, and there was no impact on education. The effects of the incentives seem 
to be about accelerating improvements rather than changing long-run outcomes—30 
months after the program started, the nonincentivized group had improved, and was 
showing the same impacts as the incentivized group compared to pure controls.
An interesting question is why health indicators appear to have been more respon-
sive than education. One possibility, explored below, is that the health providers are 
more responsive than education providers. Another possible explanation is costs: 
it may be that simple preventative care is less costly to provide and easier for the 
community to mobilize than getting the few remaining children who are not yet in 
school enrolled. Indeed, the government set the scores in Table 1 with high weights 
on education indicators precisely because it believed these were more difficult to 
achieve, but it is possible that the incentives were not sufficient to cover the dif-
ferential costs, and communities were optimizing. The subsequent sections explore, 
to the extent we can in the data, how the incentives may have worked and test for 
potential downsides.
III. Mechanisms
In this section, we explore three potential mechanisms through which the incen-
tives may have had an impact: by inducing a change in the allocation of funds, by 
changing provider or community effort, and by changing the targeting of funds and 
benefits.
A. Allocation of Funds
Table 6 examines whether the incentives had impacts on communities’ allocation 
of the grants. Each row shows the share of the village’s grant spent on the item.
The most notable finding is that the incentives led to a shift away from education 
supplies—uniforms, books, and other school supplies—and toward health expen-
ditures. Spending on education supplies is about 4 percentage points (15 percent) 
lower in incentivized villages, and health spending is about 3 percentage points 
(7 percent) higher. One interpretation is that these education supplies are essentially 
a transfer—when distributed, they tend to be distributed quite broadly to the entire 
population, the vast majority of whose children are already in school, and therefore 
may have little impact on school attendance and enrollment. As shown in Table 3, 
the incentives improved health outcomes with no detrimental effect on education, so 
combined this suggests that the incentives may have led communities to reallocate 
funds away from potentially politically popular but ineffective education spending 
towards more effective health spending.
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Communities often use the grants to provide a small amount of food at the monthly 
weighing sessions, mostly to encourage poor mothers to bring at-risk children to the 
weighing sessions to be checked by the midwife. Table 6 suggests that expenditures 
on supplementary feeding activities—which work both as a show-up incentive and 
are used intensively for underweight children—appear higher in the incentivized 
group in Wave II, although the difference is not significant. By Wave III, this effect 
reversed, which may explain why the initial differential impacts on weighings and 
malnutrition are reversed subsequently.
We also tested two hypotheses that were not borne out in the data. First, we 
expected that, since incentives effectively increase the discount rate (since a return 
in the current year will affect bonuses next year), we would expect a shift away 
from durable investments – if anything, the opposite appears to have occurred, with 
spending on health durables increasing by about 1.7 percentage points (15 percent). 
Second, we expected that incentives would lead to a decrease in “capture” for 
expenses benefitting providers (e.g., uniforms for health volunteers), but we see no 
impact on this dimension.
This evidence was on how the money was spent. Table 7 examines what house-
holds actually received from the block grants, using data from the household survey. 
Both incentivized and nonincentivized versions show substantial increases in virtu-
ally all items, confirming that the block grant did indeed result in noticeable trans-
fers of many types to households.
With respect to the incentives, there are two notable results. First, households 
were no less likely to receive a uniform or school supplies in the incentive  treatments 
Table 6—Change in Budget Allocations






















panel A. Health versus education
All health expenditures 0.470 0.432 0.033** 0.490 0.470 0.029**
(0.015) (0.012)
Health durables 0.099 0.085 0.011 0.126 0.110 0.011
(0.012) (0.015)
Health benefiting providers 0.017 0.014 0.003 0.022 0.023 0.001
panel B. transfers (0.005) (0.004)
All transfers 0.731 0.756 −0.028 0.728 0.743 −0.004
(0.025) (0.024)
Education supplies 0.236 0.274 −0.049** 0.236 0.270 −0.028
(0.025) (0.018)
Supplementary feeding 0.217 0.177 0.022 0.212 0.215 0.009
(0.014) (0.013)
Subsidies 0.279 0.305 −0.001 0.280 0.258 0.015
(0.024) (0.020)
Uniform unit values 146,132 158,407 −45,230 108,789 99,881 12,517
(54,467) (12,128)
note: See notes to Table 3. Data from administrative records, one observation per village. Since budgets are only 
available for treatment areas, columns 3 and 6 regress the variable on an incentive subdistrict dummy.
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than in the nonincentive treatments—in fact, the point estimates suggest they were 
1.0–2.7 percentage points (14–32 percent) more likely to receive a uniform with 
incentives and 1.0–1.7 percentage points (18–32 percent) more likely to receive 
other school supplies with incentives. Moreover, the self-reported monetary value of 
the uniform received is identical in both treatments. This suggests that the change in 
budgets away from uniforms and school supplies documented in Table 6 likely came 
from increased efficiency in procuring the uniforms rather than a reduction in qual-
ity or quantity. In fact, the average standardized effect suggests more direct benefits 
Table 7—Direct Benefits Received, Incentivized versus Nonincentivized




































































































































































































































notes: See notes to Table 3. Data is from the household survey. Note that instead of showing a baseline mean, we 
show the Wave II control group mean because there is no data available for these categories in Wave I. These regres-
sions also therefore do not control for baseline values. Note that average standardized effects do not include value 
of uniforms since this variable wasn’t prespecified in the analysis plan. Value of uniforms is coded as zero if the HH 
doesn’t receive the uniforms. Applying family-wise error rates (Romano and Wolf 2005) to the incentive additional 
effect (columns 4 and 7), none of the coefficients are rejected. 
VoL. 6 no. 4 23Olken et al.: ShOuld aid RewaRd PeRfORmance?
for education were received in incentivized areas, not less. Thus, on net more chil-
dren received education subsidies, even though more money was spent on health. 
Combined with the improvements in health outcomes and the fact that education did 
not suffer, the evidence suggests that the incentives improved the efficiency of the 
block grant funds.
B. Effort
A second dimension we examine is effort—both on the part of workers and on the 
part of communities. Table 8 begins by examining labor supplied by midwives, who 
are the primary health workers at the village level; teachers; and subdistrict level 
health center workers. The main impact is an increase in hours worked by midwives, 
particularly in Wave II, where midwives spent 3.2 hours (12 percent) more working 
over the 3 days prior to the survey in incentive areas compared to in nonincentive 
areas. This effect is statistically significant even when we apply the family-wise 
error rates among all health indicators. Since midwives are primary main providers 
of maternal and child health services, the increase in midwife hours is consistent 
with the increase in these services we observed above. Likewise, in Wave III, there 
was no statistically significant difference in midwife hours worked between incen-
tivized and nonincentivized treatments, as hours also appear to increase in the non-
incentivized groups, consistent with the improvements in weight checks observed in 
the household survey in the nonincentivized group in Wave III. Teacher attendance 
showed no clear pattern.
Virtually all of the midwives in our area have a mix of both public and private prac-
tice, but they vary in whether their government practice is as a full-fledged, tenured 
civil servant (pnS) or is instead on a temporary or contract basis. When we interact 
the variables in Table 8 with a dummy for whether the midwife is a tenured civil ser-
vant, we find that the incentive treatment led to a greater increase in private-practice 
hours provided by tenured civil servant midwives (see online Appendix Table 8), with 
no change in their public hours. This suggests that the fee-for-service component of 
midwives’ practices may have been a reason why they increased their service provi-
sion. Interestingly, the monetary compensation (e.g., value of subsidies per patient) 
provided to midwives did not differ between the incentivized and nonincentivized 
treatments (results not reported in table), so it was not the financial incentives per 
patient seen that resulted in the difference. More likely, it was the combination of 
other efforts to increase demand (e.g., effort from the community to bring people to 
health posts), combined with the fact that midwives were indeed paid for additional 
services they provided, that resulted in the midwives’ increase in effort.
Table 9 examines the effort of communities. We examine three types of com-
munity effort: holding more posyandus, the monthly village health meetings where 
most maternal and child health care is provided; community effort at outreach, such 
as door-to-door “sweepings” to get more kids into the posyandu and school commit-
tee meetings with parents, and community effort at monitoring, such as school com-
mittee membership and teacher meetings. We find no evidence that the incentives 
had an impact on these margins, although the program as a whole increased com-
munity participation at monthly community health outreach activities (posyandu).
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C. targeting
A third mechanism through which incentives could matter is by encouraging 
communities to target resources to those individuals who are the most elastic—i.e., 
those individuals for whom a given dollar is most likely to influence behavior. While 
we cannot estimate each household’s elasticity directly, we can examine whether 
Table 8—Worker Behavior
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notes: Data is from the survey of midwives (top panel); direct observation of schools (middle panel), household 
survey (bottom panel; wait times), and direct observation of health centers (bottom panel, provider presence). See 
also notes to Table 3. Applying family-wise error rates (Romano and Wolf 2005) to the incentive additional effect 
(columns 4 and 7), the only coefficient where the null is rejected, taking into account multiple comparisons, is total 
hours spent working over the past three days in Wave II, where health is the family.
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incentivized communities targeted differently based on per capita consumption. The 
idea is that poorer households’ behavior may be more elastic with respect to sub-
sidies than that of richer households, who can afford the targeted services with or 
without subsidies. Incentives could therefore encourage communities to target ben-
efits to poorer households and resist pressure to distribute benefits more evenly.12
The results in Table 10 show how the incentives affect the targeting of direct ben-
efits from the grants. For each specification, we re-estimate equations (1) and (2) 
with subdistrict fixed effects and interact the Generasi variables with a dummy for 
12 Of course, this prediction is theoretically ambiguous—one might also imagine that very poor households 
cannot afford services with very large subsidies, so incentives would encourage targeting of middle-income house-
holds that are closest to the margin.
Table 9—Community Effort
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Average standardized effect 0.013 −0.009 0.023 0.043* 0.047 −0.004
(0.022) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.031) (0.029)
notes: Data is from survey of the head of the posyandu and the head of schools. See also notes to Table 3. Applying 
family-wise error rates (Romano and Wolf 2005) to the incentive additional effect, no coefficients are individually 
rejected.
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the household being in the top three quintiles of the income distribution at baseline. 
The subdistrict fixed effects mean that this is controlling for the overall level of the 
outcome variable in the subdistrict, and thus picks up changes in the targeting of the 
outcomes among the rich and poor only.
Table 10 shows the results. We first present the difference between the top three 
quintiles and the bottom two quintiles for incentivized areas. A negative coefficient 
indicates that the poor received relatively more than the rich in treatment areas rela-
tive to controls. The second column presents the difference between the top three 
quintiles and the bottom two quintiles for nonincentivized treatment areas. The third 
column presents the difference between the first two columns. A negative coefficient 
indicates that the incentivized version of the program had more pro-poor targeting 
than the nonincentivized version. Panel A shows the average standardized effects 
for targeting of direct benefits (i.e., the subsidies and transfers examined in Table 
7), and panel B shows the average standardized effects for targeting of improve-
ments in actual outcomes (i.e., the main indicators examined in Table 3). Detailed 
 indicator-by-indicator results are shown in online Appendix Tables 10 and 11. The 
results in panel A suggest there is somewhat more targeting of direct benefits to the 
poor in the incentivized version of the program, but the difference between the incen-
tivized versions and nonincentivized versions is not statistically significant overall. 
Likewise in panel B there is mild suggestive evidence that incentives improve target-
ing of improvements in outcomes, but this is generally not statistically significant.
Table 10—Within-Subdistrict Targeting















































































































notes: Data is from the household survey. For each indicator in Table 3, the regression interacts the Generasi treat-
ment variables for a dummy for a household being in the top three quintiles of the baseline per-capita consumption 
distribution. Average standardized effects for the interaction with the top three quintiles variable are shown in the 
table. Panel A examines the indicators of direct benefits shown in Table 7 and panel B examines the 12 main pro-
gram indicators examined in Table 3.
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In sum, the results point to two main channels through which incentives mattered. 
Incentives led to a more efficient allocation of block grants, reducing expenditure on 
uniforms and other school supplies while not affecting a household’s receipt of these 
items, and using the savings to increase expenditures on health. And, incentives led 
to an increase in midwife hours worked, particularly from tenured, civil servant mid-
wives working in their private capacity.13 The fact that the budget impacts persist 
over time, whereas the timing of the effort impacts more directly match the timing 
of the impact on indicators shown in Table 3, suggests that the effort impacts may 
be the more important channel.
IV.  Potential Pitfalls of Incentives
In this section, we test for three types of negative consequences from the incen-
tives: multi-tasking problems (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1991), where performance 
incentives encourage substitution away from nonincentivized outcomes; manipula-
tion of performance records; and reallocation of funds toward wealthier areas.
A. Spillovers on nontargeted Indicators
Whether the incentives would increase or decrease performance on nontargeted 
indicators depends on the nature of the health and education production functions. 
For example, if there is a large fixed cost for a midwife to show up in a village, 
but a small marginal cost of seeing additional patients once she is there, one might 
expect that other midwife-provided health services would increase. Alternatively, if 
the major cost is her time, she may substitute toward the types of service incentiv-
ized in the performance bonuses and away from things outside the incentive scheme, 
such as family planning, or might spend less time with each patient.
We test for spillover effects on three health domains: utilization of nonincentivized 
health services (e.g., adult health, prenatal visits beyond the number of visits that 
qualify for incentives), quality of health service provided by midwives (as mea-
sured by the share of the total required services they provide in a typical meeting), 
and maternal knowledge and practices. We also examine potential impacts on fam-
ily composition decisions. On the education side, we examine the impact on high 
school enrollment, hours spent in school, enrollment in informal education, distance 
to school, and child labor.
Table 11 reports average standardized effects for each of these domains; the 
detailed indicator-by-indicator results can be found in online Appendix Table 5. In 
general, we find no differential negative spillover impacts of the incentives on any 
of these indicators, and, if anything, find some slight evidence of positive spillovers. 
For example, we find that the incentives led to positive effects on reductions in child 
labor (0.12 hours per child for age 7–15 in Wave II; this translates to 0.08 standard 
deviations across all child labor meaures). With regard to the neonatal mortality 
13 A final area we examined was prices for health services and school fees. While we found that the Generasi 
program did lead to increases in prices for some health services, we did not find any differential impact on prices 
between the incentivized and nonincentivized treatments. See Olken, Onishi, and Wong (2011) for more information.
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result, we find no evidence that the quality of health services (defined as the share 
of activities midwives were supposed to do during various types of visits that were 
actually performed) declined in the incentivized relative to the incentivized treat-
ment; in fact, it appeared to improve equally in both the incentivized and nonincen-
tivized treatments relative to control. The results here suggest that, with the possible 
important exception of neonatal mortality discussed above, negative spillovers on 
nontargeted indicators do not seem to be a substantial concern with the incentives 
in this context.
Table 11—Spillovers on Nontargeted Indicators, Average Standardized Effects by Indicator Family



































Health services quality 0.079** 0.064* 0.015 0.041 0.040 0.001
(0.038) (0.039) (0.040) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036)












Family composition decisions 0.014 −0.012 0.026 0.023 −0.007 0.029
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.026) (0.023)















Other enrollment metrics −0.071 −0.051 −0.019 −0.013 0.006 −0.019
(0.049) (0.046) (0.049) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018)
Transportation to school  
















































notes: See notes to Table 3. Data is from the household survey. Each row presents average standardized effects from 
a family of indicators, with the detailed indicator-by-indicator results shown in online Appendix Table 5. The indi-
vidual indicators consist of the following: Health utilization consists of deliveries based in facilities (as opposed to 
at home), use of family planning, use of curative health services, prenatal visits beyond four per pregnancy, vita-
min A drops beyond two per child. Health services quality consists of quality of prenatal care services and quality 
of posyandu services, where quality is measured as the share of services that are supposed to be provided that are 
actually provided during a typical visit. Maternal knowledge and practices are the fraction initiating breastfeeding 
within the first hour after birth, share with exclusive breastfeeding, maternal knowledge about proper treatment of 
several child health conditions, and questions about a woman’s role in decisions about children. Family composi-
tion is the fertility rate and out migration. Other enrollment metrics are gross high school enrollment, dropout rates, 
primary to junior secondary transition rates, number of hours children attend school, and the numbers attending 
primary, junior secondary, and senior secondary informal education (Paket A, B, and C). Transportation to school 
is the distance to junior secondary school, time spent traveling one-way to junior secondary school, and transporta-
tion cost each way to school. Child labor is the fraction age 7–15 who works for a wage, hours spent working for a 
wage, a dummy for doing any wage work, and a dummy for doing any household work.
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B. manipulation of performance Records
A second potential downside of performance incentives is that communities or 
providers may manipulate records to inflate scores. For example, Linden and Shastry 
(2012) show that teachers in India inflate student attendance records to allow them 
to receive subsidized grain. Manipulation of record keeping can have substantial 
efficiency costs: for example, children could fail to get immunized properly if their 
immunization records were falsified.
For immunizations and school attendance, we can check for this by comparing the 
official immunization records to an independent measure observed directly by our 
survey team. For immunization, we compare official records to the scar left by the 
BCG vaccine on the arm where it was administered (see Banerjee et al. 2008), and 
for attendance, we compare official records to random spot-checks of classrooms. 
We can check for general manipulation of the administrative data used to calculate 
the incentives by checking whether the administrative data is systematically higher 
or lower than the corresponding estimates from the survey data.
The results are shown in Table 12. Panel A explores the differences between 
BCG scars and record keeping.14 We defined a false “yes” if the child is recorded/
declared as having had the vaccine but has no scar, and likewise for a false “no.” 
We find some differences in false reports of the BCG scar based on the performance 
incentives in Wave II, though only when we compare the scar to the official immu-
nizations in the immunization record book. It is also worth noting that the number 
of children without record cards also decreased in Generasi areas, which makes this 
comparison hard to conclusively interpret as manipulation as opposed to being a 
consequence of a change in record keeping.
Panel B explores differences in attendance rates, and finds that the discrepancy 
is unchanged by the performance incentives. In fact, recorded attendance appears 
lower in the incentive treatment while actual attendance is unchanged, which sug-
gests perhaps that the incentives led to better record keeping. Panel C examines 
the difference between administrative data on performance and the corresponding 
values from the household survey.15 Average standardized effects across all 12 indi-
cators are presented in panel C of Table 12; the indicator-by-indicator results are 
available online Appendix Table 9. The results show that, for Wave II, the difference 
between the administrative data and household survey is lower in the incentive than 
nonincentivized villages, which is the opposite of what one would expect if the 
incentives led villages to systematically inflate scores in the incentivized areas.
Combined, these two pieces of evidence suggest that manipulation of record-
keeping is not a major problem of the performance incentives in this context; in fact, 
14 Note that if the child did not have a record card, we asked the mother if the child was immunized. The 
“declared” vaccinated variable is 1 if either the record book or the mother reports that the child was vaccinated.
15 For each indicator, the administrative data contains the total number of achievements per year. We divide by 
the number of people eligible to achieve the indicator (e.g., number of children age 13–15) to determine the average 
rate of achievement, which is comparable to what we observe in the household survey. Since there is no adminis-
trative data for control groups, the results show only the differences between the incentivized and nonincentivized 
groups.
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if anything, the fact that records were being used for funding decisions in incentiv-
ized areas seems to have led to more accurate record keeping, not less.
C. Allocation of Bonus money to Wealthier Areas
A third potential pitfall of incentive schemes in an aid context is that they can 
result in a transfer of funds toward areas that need aid less. Poorer or more remote 
areas, for example, might have lower performance levels, yet might actually have 
the highest marginal return from funds. The incentives attempted to mitigate this 
by creating relative incentives, with a fixed performance bonus pool for each sub-
district. The idea was that unobserved, subdistrict-specific common shocks would 
cancel out. Nevertheless, if most of the differences in productivity were within sub-
districts, not between subdistricts, the same problem could still occur.
Table 12—Manipulation of Performance Records
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Attend. rate observed 87.496 1.350 2.890* −1.540 −0.970 −2.157 1.187
[25.577] (1.632) (1.469) (1.669) (1.874) (2.017) (1.839)
Attend. rate recorded 95.795 −0.609* 0.186 −0.794* −0.201 0.142 −0.343
[7.438] (0.356) (0.367) (0.434) (0.441) (0.423) (0.437)
panel c. difference between admin. and household data
















notes: See notes to Table 3. Data from panel A comes from the household survey. False “yes” is defined as 1 if 
the child has no observed BCG scar on his/her arm but the records say that the child received the BCG immuni-
zation. For panel B, the observed attendance is the percent of students attending on the day of the survey, and the 
recorded attendance rate is the attendance in the record book on a fixed day prior to the survey taking place. For 
panel C, the dependent variable is the difference between what is recorded in MIS data for each of the 12 indicators 
and the corresponding number from the household survey, with average standardized effects shown in the table. A 
positive coefficient would indicate inflation of the program statistics (i.e., MIS is systematically higher than house-
hold). Note that since MIS data is available only for Generasi areas, panel C only compares the incentivized with 
non-incentivized areas. Applying family-wise error rates (Romano and Wolf 2005) to the incentive additional effect 
(columns 4 and 7), no individual coefficients are rejected.
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To investigate this, in Table 13, panel A, we regress the total amount of bonus 
funds each village received on village average per capita consumption, village 
remoteness (km from the district capital), and village poverty (share of households 
classified as poor by the national family planning board). In panel B, we repeat the 
same regressions for a counterfactual calculation for incentives without the relative 
performance component, where we hypothetically allocate bonus payments propor-
tionally to bonus points relative to all villages in the program, rather than relative 
only to other villages in the same subdistrict.
The results show that, in the actual allocation shown in panel A, villages that 
were more remote (further from the district capital) received more bonus funds. The 
allocation of bonus funds was unrelated to average village consumption or to vil-
lage poverty levels. By contrast, in the counterfactual calculation shown in panel B 
where incentives were based just on points earned rather than points earned relative 
to other villages in the same subdistrict, poor villages received substantially less, 
and more remote villages no longer received more. The calculation thus shows that 
the relative performance scheme was successful in preventing funds from migrating 
from poorer villages to richer villages. The counterfactual shows that had the pro-
gram not awarded incentives relative to other villages in the same subdistrict, richer 
villages would have ended up receiving more bonus funds.
V. Conclusion
We found that adding a relative performance-based incentive to a 
 community-based health and education program accelerated performance 
improvements in preventative health and malnutrition, particularly in areas with 
Table 13—Do Relative Payments Prevent Money from Flowing to Richer Areas?
Wave II Wave III
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A. Actual incentive payments 
























Observations 453 453 441 441 388 388 377 377
Panel B. Counter-factual incentive payments without relative performance within subdistricts
























Observations 453 453 441 441 388 388 377 377
Notes: Data is from program administrative records. Dependent variable is the amount of bonus money given to 
a village, in Rupiah. Each column reports the result from a separate regression. Each observation is a village. The 
sample is the eight sampled villages within each of the incentivized subdistricts. Note that MIS data on total points 
is incomplete for Wave III (second year of program). Standard errors adjusted for clustering by subdistrict.
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the lowest levels of performance before the program began. We found that while the 
block grant program overall improved enrollments after 30 months, the incentives 
had no differential impact on education. Incentives worked through increasing the 
efficiency with which funds were spent and through increasing health providers’ 
hours worked, particularly initially. There was no evidence of manipulation of 
records, and no evidence that performance incentives led to funds systematically 
flowing to richer or otherwise more advantaged areas. The main potential concern 
with the incentives was that the decline in neonatal mortality in the nonincentiv-
ized group was not observed in the incentivized areas. Though this finding is dif-
ficult to conclusively interpret, it is important that in implementing incentivized 
schemes care be taken to avoid multitasking problems.
It is difficult to interpret the magnitudes given above without some notion of 
costs. Conditional on implementing the program, adding the performance incen-
tives added very few additional costs—the same monitoring of indicators was done 
in both the incentivized and nonincentivized versions of the program, no additional 
personnel were required to do monitoring (the program would have needed facilita-
tors regardless, and the additional amount of time spent on calculating performance 
bonuses was small), and since the performance bonuses were relative within a sub-
district and the amount of money was fixed, there was no difference in the total size 
of block grants in incentivized and nonincentivized areas. In this case, the incen-
tives thus accelerated outcomes, while adding few monetary costs to the program.16 
The degree to which this applies to other contexts depends, of course, on the degree 
to which there are additional real costs associated with collecting outcome data 
for monitoring.
The results have several implications for design of performance-based aid 
schemes. First, the fact that an important channel through which incentives appeared 
to work was the reallocation of budgets suggests that one may not want to make 
the incentives too narrow—instead, to the extent the multitasking issue can be con-
trolled, it may be better to give broad incentives and let the recipients have sufficient 
power to shuffle resources to achieve them. Second, the results suggest that while 
performance-based aid can be effective, care must be taken to ensure that it does not 
result in aid money flowing to richer areas, where it may have less benefit. Indeed, 
we show that in this case, the fact that performance incentives were relative to a 
small set of close geographical neighbors meant that performance bonus money did 
not accrue to richer areas, but it would have in the absence of this relative competi-
tion. Incorporating these types of features into performance-based aid schemes may 
help obtain the promise of incentives while mitigating many of their risks.
16 A more formal cost-effectiveness calculation can be found in online Appendix V.
VoL. 6 no. 4 33Olken et al.: ShOuld aid RewaRd PeRfORmance?
REFERENCES
Alatas, Vivi, Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Benjamin A. Olken, and Julia Tobias. 2012. “Targeting 
the Poor: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia.” American Economic Review 102 (4): 
1206–40.
Almond, Douglas, and Bhashkar Mazumder. 2011. “Health Capital and the Prenatal Environment: The 
Effect of Ramadan Observance during Pregnancy.” American Economic Journal: Applied Econom-
ics 3 (4): 56–85.
Baicker, Katherine, Jeffrey Clemens, and Monica Singhal. 2012. “The Rise of the States: U.S. Fiscal 
Decentralization in the Postwar Period.” Journal of public Economics 96 (11–12): 1079–91.
Baird, Sarah, Craig McIntosh, and Berk Özler. 2011. “Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash 
Transfer Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (4): 1709–53.
Banerjee, Abhijit Vinayak, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster, and Dhruva Kothari. 2008. “Improving 
Immunization Coverage in Rural India: A Clustered Randomized Controlled Evaluation of Immu-
nization Campaigns with and without Incentives.” Unpublished.
Basinga, Paulin, Paul J. Gertler, Agnes Binagwaho, Agnes L. B. Soucat, Jennifer Sturdy, and Christel M. 
J. Vermeersch. 2011. “Effect on Maternal and Child Health Services in Rwanda of Payment to Pri-
mary Health-Care Providers for Performance: An Impact Evaluation.” Lancet 377 (9775): 1421–28.
Birdsall, Nancy, and William D. Savedoff. 2009. cash on delivery: A new Approach to Foreign Aid. 
Washington, DC: Center for Global Development.
Bozzoli, Carlos, Angus Deaton, and Climent Quintana-Domeque. 2009. “Adult Height and Childhood 
Disease.” demography 46 (4): 647–69.
Casey, Katherine, Rachel Glennerster, and Edward Miguel. 2012. “Reshaping Institutions: Evidence 
on Aid Impacts Using a Preanalysis Plan.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (4): 1755–1812.
Das, Jishnu, Stefan Dercon, James Habyarimana, Pramila Krishnan, Karthik Muralidharan, and 
Venkatesh Sundararaman. 2013. “School Inputs, Household Substitution, and Test Scores.” Amer-
ican Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5 (2): 29–57.
Duflo, Esther, Rema Hanna, and Stephen P. Ryan. 2012. “Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come 
to School.” American Economic Review 102 (4): 1241–78.
Express India News Service. 2008. “Biometric Attendance to Keep Track of Students, Teachers in Pri-
mary Schools.” http://expressindia.indianexpress.com/story_print.php?storyId=340201.
Finkelstein, Amy, Sarah Taubman, Bill Wright, Mira Bernstein, Jonathan Gruber, Joseph P. New-
house, Heidi Allen, and Katherine Baicker. 2012. “The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evi-
dence from the First Year.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 127 (3): 1057–1106.
Gertler, Paul. 2004. “Do Conditional Cash Transfers Improve Child Health? Evidence from PRO-
GRESA’s Control Randomized Experiment.” American Economic Review 94 (2): 336–41.
Gibbons, Robert, and Kevin J. Murphy. 1990. “Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive 
Officers.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 (3): 30–51.
Gørgens, Tue, Xin Meng, and Rhema Vaithianathan. 2012. “Stunting and Selection Effects of Famine: 
A Case Study of the Great Chinese Famine.” Journal of development Economics 97 (1): 99–111.
Holmstrom, Bengt. 1979. “Moral Hazard and Observability.” Bell Journal of Economics 10 (1): 74–91.
Holmstrom, Bengt, and Paul Milgrom. 1991. “Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Con-
tracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design.” Journal of Law, Economics and organization 7 (Special 
Issue): 24–52.
Huang, Cheng, Michael R. Phillips, Yali Zhang, Jingxuan Zhang, Qichang Shi, Zhiqiang Song, Zhijie 
Ding, Shutao Pang, and Reynaldo Martorell. 2013. “Malnutrition in Early Life and Adult Mental 
Health: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.” Social Science & medicine 97: 259–66.
Imbens, Guido W., and Joshua D. Angrist. 1994. “Identification and Estimation of Local Average 
Treatment Effects.” Econometrica 62 (2): 467–75.
Kling, Jeffrey R., Jeffrey B. Liebman, and Lawrence F. Katz. 2007. “Experimental Analysis of Neigh-
borhood Effects.” Econometrica 75 (1): 83–119.
Lazear, Edward P., and Sherwin Rosen. 1981. “Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Con-
tracts.” Journal of political Economy 89 (5): 841–64.
Levy, Santiago. 2006. progress Against poverty: Sustaining mexico’s progresa-oportunidades pro-
gram. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
Linden, Leigh L., and Gauri Kartini Shastry. 2012. “Grain Inflation: Identifying Agent Discretion in 
Response to a Conditional School Nutrition Program.” Journal of development Economics 99 (1): 
128–38.
Mookherjee, Dilip. 1984. “Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents.” Review of Economic Stud-
ies 51 (3): 433–46.
34 AmERIcAn EconomIc JouRnAL: AppLIEd EconomIcS octoBER 2014
Muralidharan, Karthik, and Venkatesh Sundararaman. 2011. “Teacher Performance Pay: Experi-
mental Evidence from India.” Journal of political Economy 119 (1): 39–77.
Musgrave, Richard A. 1997. “Devolution, Grants, and Fiscal Competition.” Journal of Economic per-
spectives 11 (4): 65–72.
Oates, Wallace E. 1999. “An Essay on Fiscal Federalism.” Journal of Economic Literature 37 (3): 
1120–49.
Olken, Benjamin A., Junko Onishi, and Susan Wong. 2011. Indonesia’s pnpm Generasi program: 
Final Impact Evaluation Report. World Bank. Jakarta, March.
Olken, Benjamin A., Junko Onishi, and Susan Wong. 2014. “Should Aid Reward Performance? Evi-
dence from a Field Experiment on Health and Education in Indonesia: Dataset.” American Eco-
nomic Journal: Applied Economics. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/app.6.4.1.
Romano, Joseph P., and Michael Wolf. 2005. “Stepwise Multiple Testing as Formalized Data Snoop-
ing.” Econometrica 73 (4): 1237–82.
Schultz, T. Paul. 2004. “School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican Progresa Poverty Pro-
gram.” Journal of development Economics 74 (1): 199–250.
Valente, Christine. 2013. “Civil Conflict, Gender-Specific Fetal Loss, and Selection: A New Test of the 
Trivers-Willard Hypothesis.” Unpublished.
